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Abstract—The vulnerability of deep neural networks (DNNs)
to adversarial attack, which is an attack that can mislead state-
of-the-art classifiers into making an incorrect classification with
high confidence by deliberately perturbing the original inputs,
raises concerns about the robustness of DNNs to such attacks.
Adversarial training, which is the main heuristic method for
improving adversarial robustness and the first line of defense
against adversarial attacks, requires many sample-by-sample
calculations to increase training size and is usually insufficiently
strong for an entire network. This paper provides a new per-
spective on the issue of adversarial robustness, one that shifts
the focus from the network as a whole to the critical part
of the region close to the decision boundary corresponding to
a given class. From this perspective, we propose a method to
generate a single but image-agnostic adversarial perturbation
that carries the semantic information implying the directions to
the fragile parts on the decision boundary and causes inputs to be
misclassified as a specified target. We call the adversarial training
based on such perturbations “region adversarial training” (RAT),
which resembles classical adversarial training but is distinguished
in that it reinforces the semantic information missing in the
relevant regions. Experimental results on the MNIST and CIFAR-
10 datasets show that this approach greatly improves adversarial
robustness even using a very small dataset from the training data;
moreover, it can defend against FGSM adversarial attacks that
have a completely different pattern from the model seen during
retraining.
Index Terms—adversarial robustness, semantic information,
region adversarial training, targeted universal perturbations.
I. INTRODUCTION
AS an accepted technique in machine learning, deeplearning (DL) has proved itself capable of performing
singularly well on a number of categories of machine learning
tasks [1]. In particular, deep neural networks (DNNs) can
learn very effective models for input classification. State-of-
the-art DNNs have achieved impressive performance in tasks
of computer vision [2], [3], speech recognition [4], [5], and
natural language understanding [6], [7] and provide solutions
based on these tasks for many other problems, such as in
medical science [8]. The universal approximator theorem [9]
guarantees the representational power of DNNs but does not
indicate whether a training algorithm will be able to discover
a function having all the desired properties.
For all the success of deep learning algorithms, Szegedy
et al. [10], [11] revealed an inherent weakness of DNNs by
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pointing out the existence of a new type of attack called
an adversarial attack. The adversary in this type of attack
misleads models into producing an incorrect output with an
adversarial example, a plausible member of input datasets that
is only slightly different from benign examples, created by
adding a carefully constructed adversarial perturbation. For
example, the images on the diagonal in Fig. 1 are unperturbed
clean examples, and the other images are adversarial examples
misclassified as specified target classes that are almost imper-
ceptible to human vision. Recent studies have made it clear
that DNNs are universally vulnerable to adversarial examples;
this seems to contradict the assumptions that underlie many
deep learning methods and suggests that our deep classifiers
based on modern machine learning techniques have only built
a Potemkin village instead of learning the true underlying
concepts that determine a correct output label. Ideally, the
label estimated by a classifier should not be altered by a
sufficiently small perturbation of an input data point, let alone
an adversarial perturbation. This excellent property, called
robustness, is extremely significant for DNNs when applied
in realistic contexts, and above all in security-critical environ-
ments [12]. Because of the importance and imminence of the
issue, the robustness of classifiers to adversarial examples has
been attracting much attention in recent years.
Previous studies on the robustness of DNNs have ap-
proached the question from two directions, attempting either to
prove a lower bound of robustness through formal guarantees
or to find an upper bound of robustness through adversarial
attacks. The formal approach is sound but difficult to carry out
in practice [13], whereas heuristic defenses against adversarial
attacks are not sufficiently strong [14]. There is a puzzling
problem concerning the latter approach. It is generally believed
that neural networks are not learning the true concepts [11], yet
the adversarial perturbations generated by almost all known
methods appear to be chaotic! This seems counter-intuitive,
because if the network is missing important information re-
lated to the true underlying concepts, this information should
be reflected in the adversarial examples, representing the blind
spots of the network.
In addition, despite a number of meaningful studies on
the issue, achieving ideal robustness remains a difficult goal.
Improving the adversarial robustness of a network as a whole
is rather ambitious and difficult; sometimes enhancing the
robustness of particular regions in the manifold represented by
the network can provide a greater benefit in reality. This is even
more remarkable for certain application scenarios, especially
security-sensitive applications. For example, for a classifier
that distinguishes different kinds of animals, it is no more
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2Fig. 1: Illustration of targeted unieversal perturbations (TUPs)
attacks on a typical DNN using images sampled from CIFAR-
10, showing source–target pairs. To facilitate the presentation,
we use the numbers 0–9 to represent the ten classes of CIFAR-
10. The number preceding each row represents the source
class, and the number preceding each column represents the
target class. For example, an image with a row number of 1
and a column number of 2 is a TUP adversarial example whose
true label is class 1 but is incorrectly classified as class 2. All
of the original images displayed were selected at random.
dangerous to classify dogs as cats than dogs as birds, but in the
case of a multi-category classifier for malware classification
or for traffic sign recognition as used in autonomous vehicles,
things are quite different [15]. Incorrectly classifying a yield
sign as a stop sign is likely to be safer than misclassifying it as
a sign that allows vehicles to pass. Similarly, misclassifying
malware as belonging to the wrong malware family is less
harmful than incorrectly classifying it as benign.
Furthermore, almost all heuristic methods for improving
adversarial robustness require a large number of calculations
on a very large dataset of a size comparable to that of the
training set. This considerably reduces their suitability for
practical scenarios, especially application environments having
high timeliness requirements.
In this paper, we focus on the region corresponding to
a certain class in the manifold represented by the attacked
network, and we propose a method to extract semantic infor-
mation that is universal for most examples from a small set of
the data points that lie very close to the classifier’s decision
boundary separating one class from all others. The key idea
is to emphasize to the classifier the semantic information
it has not yet learned and to prompt the classifier to learn
a clearer (usually more complicated) decision boundary and
the underlying concepts. We retain this universality property
across the inputs as [16] did, but unlike researchers in previous
studies, we generate perturbations containing semantic infor-
mation instead of meaningless noise with the aim of improving
robustness. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We find that there exists a single perturbation applicable
to most of the inputs that could constitute a targeted
adversarial attack on a classifier, and, importantly, that
such perturbations are not meaningless but contain ex-
plicit semantic information. Furthermore, we propose
an algorithm for generating such targeted universal per-
turbations (TUPs). The algorithm computes a series of
perturbation vectors one at a time, sending a data point
to the classification boundary of the region corresponding
to the specified target class for a set of points in the
training dataset, and then aggregates the perturbation
vectors to find a universal vector indicating the direction
to the region in an iterative way. We show that the
proposed algorithm can calculate such a perturbation on
a very small set of training data points, which causes new
samples to be misclassified as a specific target class with
high probability.
• We present a new approach to improve adversarial ro-
bustness, called region adversarial training (RAT), and
formalize it conceptually. RAT pays special attention to
the region near the decision boundary corresponding to a
selected target class and then uses the extracted semantic
information related to this region to guide the retraining
process. The information used by RAT comprises the
common patterns for most samples that follow the same
distribution as the training data, and these patterns contain
semantic information related to the true underlying con-
cepts; consequently, RAT can not only perform well on
a very small data set, but also defend against adversarial
attacks that have never been seen by the network before.
• We validate the algorithm by reporting the results of
extensive experiments using MNIST [17] and CIFAR-10
[2] and show that the perturbations achieve a similar high
attack success rate for each target class. We also system-
atically evaluate the choice of algorithm parameters. We
find that our TUP perturbations not only retain the univer-
sality property of being able to fool unseen data points
but also transfer well across different architectures and
can work well even when calculated from a very small
dataset. We show experimentally that using the proposed
algorithm to provide examples for region adversarial
training (even on a very small set from training data),
the test set accuracy on both TUP adversarial examples
and the best-known FGSM adversarial examples [11] can
be increased on MNIST and CIFAR-10.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we summarize recent work on generating adversarial examples
and improving adversarial robustness. Section III provides the
preliminaries and defines the notation. Then, we introduce
the proposed approaches for finding TUPs and formalize
the region adversarial training method in Section IV. The
experiments we conducted to test the proposed method are
described and their results analyzed in Section V. Finally, we
conclude with Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
As our goal is to extract missed semantic information
through a method of generating adversarial examples and
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Fig. 2: Overview of region adversarial training (RAT) based on TUP adversarial examples. (a) shows the entire RAT process.
(b) is an illustration of Algorithm 1 for computing a TUP perturbation.
then to improve the robustness of DNNs, this section first
introduces the work related to the generation of adversarial
examples and then describes the studies on improving adver-
sarial robustness.
Adversarial examples. Szegedy et al. [10] discovered the
existence of the possibility of adversarial attacks on deep
neural networks by generating adversarial examples using box-
constrained L-BFGS. The fact that deep neural networks are
surprisingly susceptible to such adversarial attacks triggered
the wide interest of researchers in the security and machine
learning communities, and since then, a sizable body of related
literature has introduced several new methods for crafting
adversarial examples to construct an upper bound on the
robustness of neural networks. Goodfellow et al. [11] proposed
a method called “Fast Gradient Sign Method” (FGSM), which
perturbs an image to increase the loss of the classifier on the
resulting image based on the “linearity hypothesis” of deep
network models in higher-dimensionality space. Instead of
using the L2-norm as in FGSM, Kurakin et al. [18] presented
an alternative approach named “Fast Gradient L∞” and also
extended FGSM to a “target class” variation wherein the label
of the class least likely to be predicted by the attacked network
is used as the target class. Unlike the one-step methods, which
take a single step in the direction that increases the loss, the
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [19] computes the perturbation
iteratively by adjusting the direction step by step. Papernot et
al. [20] modified pixels of the original image one at a time by
computing a saliency map and then monitored the effect of the
changes. The method proposed by Su et al. [21] was deduced
for the extreme case in which only one pixel in the image is
allowed to change for the attacker, and they reported a fairly
good success rate, 70.97%. A more refined algorithm, named
DeepFool [22], moves a given image toward the boundary
of a polyhedron through a small vector based on an iterative
linearization of the classifier to compute a minimal-norm
adversarial perturbation. All of the above methods compute
adversarial perturbations to fool an attacked network using a
single image; the method in [16] is fundamentally different.
The authors computed perturbations that do not involve a
data-dependent optimization but fooled the classifier on all
images through one and the same perturbation. However, the
perturbations they performed caused the clean samples to
be misclassified as any (unpredictable) class and contained
very little semantic information. By contrast, our approach
computes a perturbation that moves the sample in a specific
direction chosen to cause the perturbed sample to be mis-
classified as a target class t while preserving the universality
property across samples, without the need to use any complex
generative models such as in [23]. More importantly, our
approach extracts explicit semantic information with very few
samples and generates adversarial perturbations that show
this semantic information clearly and that exhibit a pattern
completely different from the others.
Adversarial robustness. The appearance of adversarial ex-
amples reveals the intrinsic vulnerability of the existing neural
network methodology; therefore, studies on improving its ro-
bustness to adversarial examples are of great importance. Work
has generally been developing in two different directions. One
way of making neural networks robust to adversarial attacks
focuses on formally ensuring their robustness. Robustness
verification is a general method for obtaining safety guarantees
[24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30]; it is typically based on
sophisticated theory and is usually computationally expensive.
As the investigation in this paper does not involve formal
verification techniques, we do not go into detail here. The
other way is to explore heuristic defenses against adversarial
examples (including their detection), by means of modifying
networks directly [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38],
[39], [40], [41], [42], using extra network add-ons [43],
[44], [45], [46], or changing the training procedure or using
modified inputs in the inference phase [47], [48], [49], [50],
[51], [52], [53], [54]. The method presented in this paper is
of this type and, more specifically, falls into the category of
adversarial training [11], [55], which modifies the training
4procedure with adversarial inputs. What most distinguishes
our work from other adversarial training methods is that
whereas to our knowledge all existing methods improve the
adversarial robustness of networks as a whole, ours focuses on
certain regions in the manifold represented by the network.
In addition, all existing studies on adversarial training have
used an image-specific method to increase the size of the
training dataset, which requires at least one calculation for
each example on a very large dataset (usually a multiple of
the training set). To the best of our knowledge, the method in
[16] is the only exception; it calculates a single image-agnostic
perturbation for a set of training points, but it leads to only a
slight improvement in robustness. Our method is designed to
enhance the robustness of DNNs on a very small set by using
perturbations that contain semantic information and retain the
universality property but that are completely different from the
patterns in [16].
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Neural networks: Definitions and notation
A neural network used as a multi-class classifier, which is
the case exclusively studied in this paper, is given an input and
provides a corresponding class probability vector as output.
Formally, a classifier f̂ : Rn → {1. . .K} accepts an input
x ∈ Rn and provides an estimated label f̂(x) as output for
it. We assume that x ∼ ψ, where ψ denotes a distribution of
inputs in Rn. The output vector f̂(x) represents the probability
that the input x belongs to each of the K classes. The classifier
assigns the label ŷ(x) = argmax f̂(x)i to the input x; the
ground-truth label is denoted by y. The model f̂ depends on
some parameters θ, but as the network is fixed for our method
of crafting an adversarial perturbation, we will omit θ from f̂
when there is no ambiguity. We define J(θ,x, y) as the loss
function used to train the model.
B. Adversarial examples
Given a naturally occurring example (clean example) x
and a classifier f̂(·), an adversarial example [10] is an input
that causes the classifier to make a mistake. An adversary
launches adversarial attacks by crafting adversarial examples.
Let x′ = x+r be an adversarial example that is very similar to
x, where r is a small vector called an adversarial perturbation.
More precisely, an untargeted adversarial example is one that
causes the classifier to predict any incorrect label (i.e., it makes
f̂(x′) 6= f̂(x)), and a targeted adversarial example is one
that causes the classifier to change the prediction to some
specific target class t (i.e., f̂(x′) = t). It is apparent that
untargeted adversarial attacks are strictly less powerful than
targeted adversarial attacks, meaning that if an adversarial
example can cause a targeted adversarial attack, it can certainly
cause an untargeted adversarial attack[56],[57]. The similarity
between x and x′ is usually measured by some distance metric
d(·). In the literature for generating adversarial examples,
the three distance metrics L0-norm, L2-norm, and L∞-norm
(collectively, Lp-norms) are widely used. The Lp-norm of a
vector v is defined as
‖v‖p =
(
n∑
i=1
|vi|p
) 1
p
.
In this paper, we focus on the L∞ distance. It is true that
no distance metric is a perfect measure of human perception,
especially considering different scenarios. Constructing and
evaluating a good distance metric may be intuitive, but we
do not judge which distance metric is optimal as it is not the
focus of this paper. Instead, we use L∞ distance, as Lp is
sufficient for the computer vision classification task that is the
focus of this paper, and L∞ norm is considered as the optimal
choice [14] and has been widely used in many studies [58][59].
C. Threat model
The threat model of a system, which often involves ad-
versarial goals and capabilities, can be used to measure the
security of the system. If a system using a DNN is viewed
as a generalized data processing pipeline, at inference phase
the system collects inputs from sensors or data repositories
and then processes the inputs in the digital domain and feeds
them to the model to produce an output for external systems
or users to receive and act upon. According to the attack
surface defined with this procedure, in this paper we consider
adversaries that are capable of manipulating the collection and
processing of data to tamper with the output. The adversaries
have no knowledge of the model architecture or values of any
parameters or trainable weights, but they have direct access to
at least some of the training data, and of course they can query
the model, i.e., feed it inputs and receive outputs. Finally, by
modeling the adversarial goals using a classical approach that
includes confidentiality, integrity, and availability, called CIA
[60], it can be seen that the main threat from such adversaries
is to compromise the integrity of the DNN-based system. As
they are capable of destroying the input–output mapping of
the model, they can also achieve the goal of undermining
availability, despite the difference between availability and
integrity in definition.
IV. METHODOLOGY
An overview of the method for generating TUP adversarial
examples and performing region adversarial training is given
in Fig. 2(a). A conceptual illustration of the method for
computing TUPs is presented in Fig. 2 (b). As shown in Fig. 2
(a), a common neural network A can correctly classify a clean
input but cannot correctly classify an adversarial example in
the inference phase. Retraining using our RAT method based
on TUPs results in a more robust network B that can correctly
classify even the unseen adversarial examples. In Fig. 2 (b),
we use black solid lines represent a simple decision boundary
(which is linear in this case) for the original network. A set of
data points can be easily separated with the simple decision
boundary, but the L∞ balls around the data points cannot be
separated well. Let Fk =
{
x : fˆk(x)− fˆt(x) = 0
}
(in the
case shown in Fig. 2(b), k = 1, 2, 3) describe the region of the
5space where the classifier outputs label t. For each point whose
ground-truth label is not t but is not classified correctly by
the simple decision boundary, the method calculates a vector
that touches a polyhedron that approximates the region Fk.
Then, by continuously aggregating these vectors and updating
the perturbation vector, we finally obtain a TUP perturbation
that captures the semantic information that the network has
not learned but is about the decision boundary of the region
where the classifier outputs label t. Using this information to
retrain the network, a more complicated decision boundary,
needed to separate adversarial examples in the L∞ balls, can
be obtained (represented by the red curve in Fig. 2(b)). This
makes the resulting network more robust against adversarial
attacks with bounded L∞ perturbations.
A. Targeted universal perturbations
The problem of generating an adversarial example for an
input x is equivalent to that of finding a minimum adversarial
perturbation r that satisfies the adversarial condition. Formally,
this problem can be defined as follows:
min
r
d(x, x+ r)
s.t. f̂(x+ r) = t.
(1)
In Eq. (1), x and x + r must be drawn from the same
distribution ψ and the same feature space. As our aim is to
cause a targeted adversarial attack for most inputs through a
single perturbation and to extract semantic information from
them, the problem differs a bit. Our generation method focuses
on the following question: Can we find a perturbation vector
r ∈ Rn that causes the classifier to misclassify almost all data
points sampled from ψ as a certain class t that differs from
the correct prediction for the original input? In other words,
we look for a vector r for most x ∼ ψ such that
f̂(x+ r) = t 6= f̂(x). (2)
According to the concepts of adversarial examples and adver-
sarial perturbations as described before, each of the following
two constraints on the perturbation vector r must be satisfied:
d(r) ≤ η (3a)
P
x∼ψ
(f̂(x+ r) = t) ≥ 1− δ. (3b)
In Eq. (3a), we use d(r) as a measure of the quantified
similarity. In Eq. (3b), we use 1 − δ to denote the success
rate threshold, where the parameter δ ∈ (0, 1] is a scalar. The
parameter η restricts the magnitude of the perturbation. The
smaller the value of η, the harder it is for a human to perceive
the perturbation in the image, and on the other hand, a larger
1−δ value (i.e., a smaller δ value) implies a stronger attack that
is more powerful for generating a desired perturbation. We call
such a perturbation r a targeted-(δ, η)-universal perturbation
(TUP), as this single input-agnostic perturbation, restricted by
the parameters δ and η, causes the predicted label of most data
points sampled from the data distribution ψ to be converted
to the target class t.
Algorithm 1. In this paper, we propose an algorithm
that seeks a common perturbation r for most data points
in X = {x1, . . . , xs}, which is a set of images sampled
from the same distribution ψ, such that the attacked neural
network is caused to misclassify the perturbed input as a pre-
selected target class t and such that r satisfies ‖r‖∞ ≤ η.
The algorithm progressively establishes the target universal
perturbation via an iterative procedure over the data points
in X . At each iteration, it computes a minimal perturbation
∆ri that sends the current perturbed point xi + ri toward the
decision boundary of target class t of the classifier, and then
aggregates ∆ri to the current instance of the target universal
perturbation ri, as illustrated in Fig. 2(b). More specifically,
as long as data point xi perturbed by the current ri is not
classified as the target class t by the attacked model, we solve
the following optimization problem to find a supplemental ∆ri
that will lead to misclassification on xi:
∆ri ← arg min
σ
‖σ‖∞
s.t. f̂(xi + ri + σ) = t.
(4)
We treat the problem in Eq. (4) as a suitable optimization
instance and solve it by existing optimization algorithms such
as that given in [14]. To reduce the computational cost while
ensuring that the constraint ‖r‖∞ ≤ η is satisfied, the updated
perturbation r is further clipped and projected onto the `∞
ball, with radius η and centered at 0, every k iterations; the
projection operator P∞,η is defined as follows:
P∞,η = arg min
r
‖r − r‖2
s.t. ‖r‖∞ ≤ η.
(5)
Then, we use the operator in Eq. (5) to update the perturbation
vector r in the ith iteration as follows:
r ←
{
P∞,η(r + ∆ri), for i|k = 0, i 6= 0
r + ∆ri, otherwise
. (6)
When the attack success rate for target class t exceeds the
desired threshold 1 − δ on the perturbed dataset Xr :=
{x1 + r, . . . , xs + r}, the algorithm is stopped. The success
rate Succ(Xr) is defined as the likelihood of success that the
perturbation will change the label to the target class t. In other
words, the terminal condition of the algorithm is
Succ(Xr) :=
1
s
s∑
i=1
1f̂(xi+r)=t ≥ 1− δ, (7)
where 1f̂(xi+r)=t is the indicator function. The details of the
algorithm are provided as Algorithm 1.
B. Region adversarial training
In order to use the TUP approach to enhance the adversarial
robustness of deep networks, we introduce a training method,
which we call region adversarial training (RAT). The purpose
of the training is not to enhance the entire network in un-
differentiated ways; instead, it focuses on the weaker regions
of the network or the regions of most interest to the user.
In region adversarial training, the network is not trained on
all inputs from the training set perturbed but on a mixture of
6Algorithm 1: Computation of targeted universal perturba-
tion.
Input: Dataset X , classifier f̂ , target class t, desired
L∞-norm of the perturbation η, desired projection
operator step size k, desired accuracy on
perturbed data points δ
Output: targeted-(δ, η)-universal perturbation (TUP)
vector r
1 Initialize r ← 0.
2 while Succ(Xr)<1− δ do
3 for every xi ∈ X do
4 if f̂(xi + r) 6= t then
5
∆ri ← arg min
σ
‖σ‖∞
s.t.f̂(xi + ri + σ) = t
if i|k = 0 and i 6= 0 then
6 Update the perturbation using the
projection operator:
r ← P∞,η(r + ∆ri)
7 else
8 Update the perturbation:
r ← r + ∆ri
9 end
10 end
11 end
12 end
original training data and training data perturbed by the TUP
method. The targeted universal perturbation that is computed
can be considered as containing more complex information of
a certain class region’s decision boundaries that the network
has not yet learned from the original training set. The intuition
behind region adversarial training is that incorporating this
information into the training will improve the classification
accuracy on adversarial examples of the classifier for this class.
Formally, let Θ∗ be the weights of a neural network; then
standard training learns Θ∗ as
Θ∗ = arg min
θ
Ex∈χJ(θ,x, y). (8)
The adversarial training proposed by Szegedy et al. [10] was
originally for solving the following min–max formulation:
Θ∗ = arg min
θ
Ex∈χ[ max
δ∈∆(x)
J(θ,x+ δ, y)], (9)
where δ represents adversarial perturbations computed by
some method; in [10], a linear approximation method named
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) was used to generate
δ. The original adversarial training process trained on the
perturbed samples roughly, without direction or distinction.
The region adversarial training method proposed here pays
special attention to the region of the space where the classifier
outputs a certain class label t in the manifold represented by
the network. Using this method, Θ∗ is computed as
Θ∗ = arg min
θ
Ex∈χ[ max
δ∈∆(x)
[J0(θ,x, y)
+ Jadv(θ,x+ δ, y)]],
(10)
J0(θ,x, y) =
∑
xi∈χ,f(xi)=t
J(θ,xi, y), (11)
Jadv(θ,x+ δ, y) =
∑
xi∈χ,f(xi)6=t
J(θ,xi + δ, y). (12)
The saddle point problem in Eq. (10) is similar to that in
Eq. (9) in its composition of an inner maximization problem
and an outer minimization problem. The loss function J0 in
Eq. (11) is independent of the perturbation δ, and so the inner
maximization problem in Eq. (10) can be rewritten as
J0(θ,x, y) + max
δ∈∆(x)
[Jadv(θ,x+ δ, y)]. (13)
Let rt be the perturbation vector found by Algorithm 1; then
rt can be interpreted as a scheme for maximizing the loss
Jadv in Eq. (13). Thus, the weights Θ∗ are computed by the
region adversarial training as
Θ∗ = arg min
θ
Ex∈χ[J0(θ,x, y) + Jadv(θ,x+ rt, y)]. (14)
Eq. (14) can be used for any suitable loss function J(θ,x, y);
in this paper, we use the common cross-entropy loss function
for neural networks.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, the cases for the experimental investigation
are introduced. Before turning to our approach for generating
adversarial examples and improving adversarial robustness,
we describe the architectures of the models on which we
evaluated the proposed approach and the datasets we used.
Then, we describe how the TUPs were generated for MNIST
and CIFAR-10, show the performance of our TUP attack,
discuss the influence of parameter selection, and study the
property of transferability across different models and the per-
formance on small datasets. Finally, based on the experimental
results, we discuss whether the proposed region adversarial
training with TUPs can improve adversarial robustness not
only against TUP itself but also against FGSM adversarial
examples. Furthermore, we also remark on the size of the set
X needed to achieve the desired results.
A. Experimental setup
Dataset description. To ascertain the feasibility and ef-
fectiveness of the algorithm proposed in this paper, a series
of experiments were performed on two widely used machine
learning datasets: MNIST and CIFAR-10. The MNIST dataset
is a collection of black and white images of handwritten digits;
it contains 60, 000 28 × 28 training samples and 10, 000 test
samples, each pixel of which is encoded as a real number
between 0 and 1. The CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60, 000
32 × 32 color images, which are divided into a training set
of 50, 000 images and a test set of 10, 000 images, each pixel
7of which takes the value of a real number between 0 and 255
for three color channels. For both the MNIST and CIFAR-10
datasets, we created a validation set containing 5000 examples
from the training set. Each image in the MNIST and CIFAR-10
dataset is associated with a label from ten classes. In MNIST,
the classes are the values ranging from 0 to 9, representing the
digit written, and in CIFAR-10, the ten classes are airplane,
automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship, and truck.
TABLE I: Baseline accuracy (acc.) of five MNIST classifiers
and five CIFAR-10 classifiers.
Architecture (MNIST) Acc. (%)
Classifier-M-Primary (ClassifierMp) 99.34
Classifier-M-Alternate-0 (ClassifierM0) 99.31
Classifier-M-Alternate-1 (ClassifierM1) 99.38
Classifier-M-Alternate-2 (ClassifierM2) 99.30
Classifier-M-Alternate-3 (ClassifierM3) 99.35
Architecture (CIFAR-10) Acc. (%)
Classifier-C-Primary (ClassifierCp) 77.74
Classifier-C-Alternate-0 (ClassifierC0) 78.03
Classifier-C-Alternate-1 (ClassifierC1) 73.55
Classifier-C-Alternate-2 (ClassifierC2) 73.09
Classifier-C-Alternate-3 (ClassifierC3) 75.46
Architecture characteristics. To begin our empirical ex-
plorations, we trained five networks each for the standard
MNIST and CIFAR-10 classification tasks. The five networks
differed only in their initial weights or their architectures.
The baseline accuracies on clean data (unperturbed data) are
listed in Table I. The details of the model architectures and
the hyper-parameters we used are given in the Appendix. The
performance of the networks on MNIST was comparable to
state-of-the-art performance [61], but note that the accuracy
on CIFAR-10 was much lower for all five networks. The
state-of-the-art accuracy on CIFAR-10 is higher [62], but to
achieve this performance, data augmentation or additional
dropout must be used. In the context of adversarial robustness,
researchers are typically concerned with the original data,
and we achieved a test accuracy of 77.74%, which is very
close to the state-of-the-art validation accuracy without any
data augmentation [63]. We did not attempt to increase this
number through tuning hyper-parameters or any of the many
other techniques available, as we wanted to use a typical
convolution structure (based on the well-studied LeNet [64])
that is commonly used in other studies and training approaches
that are identical to those presented in [36] and [14] to make
it easy for others to compare with or replicate our work.
B. Crafting of adversarial examples using TUPs
Success rate. To evaluate the attack performance of the
proposed algorithm, we report the success rate, which is
defined as the proportion of samples that are misclassified as
target class t when perturbed by our perturbation, on CIFAR-
10 and MNIST (Fig. 3). For all of the model architectures,
results are reported on set X , which was randomly selected
from the training sets of CIFAR-10 and MNIST to compute
the perturbation, and on a validation set that had never been
used during the process of computing the perturbation. The set
X contained 10, 000 images, and the validation set contained
5000 images for both CIFAR-10 and MNIST. As can be
seen, the perturbations achieved quite high success rates for
all sets of conditions, although there are some differences in
the success rates because of differences in architecture, target
classes, datasets, and parameter selection, which we discuss
below. Notably, these results demonstrate the universality
property, namely, that any image in the validation set can be
used to fool the classifier into misclassifying it as a target
class t (different from its source class) by the mere addition of
the TUP perturbation computed on another disjoint set. Fig. 1
illustrates images before and after perturbation by TUPs; note
that in most cases, the perturbations are nearly imperceptible.
We display these perturbations in Fig. 4, where the patterns
of the perturbations are clearly shown and are seen to contain
distinct semantic information. Let N be the number of images
in set X , representing the size of X . In all of the above
experiments, we used k = N , η = 0.1 for CIFAR-10 and
k = N , η = 0.8 for MNIST, chosen empirically. Although
these values for parameters k and η worked well enough,
we explored further to learn whether there might be different
options for other situations. The effect of the parameter values
was evaluated on the baseline network ClassifierCp, and some
of these results are shown in Fig. 5. Please note that in order to
reduce the amount of calculation required, we chose a smaller
set X , which included 3000 CIFAR-10 images, to compute the
adversarial perturbations and selected the target frog (class 6,
chosen randomly from the ten classes) to use as an example.
Using a larger value for the projection step size k results in
fewer projection operations. Thus, it is natural to hypothesize
that the success rate will decrease as k increases. The results
displayed in Fig. 5(a) do not violate our intuition: With k =
100, 97.61% of the examples in the validation set disjoint with
X were classified incorrectly as the target class frog, whereas
when k increased to 3000 (equal to the size of X) the attack
success rate decreased to 92.66%. In contrast with this modest
decrease in the attack success rate, it is surprising to see that
the calculation time decreased dramatically as k increased.
When k = 3000, it required only slightly more than half the
time needed for k = 100. Therefore, as long as one is not
pursuing extremely high performance in terms of the success
rate, a larger value of k is not a bad choice because it can
greatly reduce the time complexity of the algorithm.
The effect of parameter η, the radius of the l∞ ball on
which the perturbation is projected during the computation, is
rather interesting. We varied η from 0.08 to 0.5 and found
that the success rate increased linearly from η = 0.08 to η =
0.15 and then plateaued from η = 0.15 to η = 0.5; clearly,
therefore, increasing η increased the attack success rate of a
TUP perturbation, as displayed in Fig. 5(b). It should be noted
that the method proposed in Algorithm 1 is not theoretically
guaranteed to converge to the optimal solution, as it operates
in a greedy way. When η was chosen to be very small, the
success rate oscillated back and forth far below the desired
performance, and we observed that the smaller the value, the
more violent the oscillation, and thus the more difficult the
convergence.
We compared the proposed TUP method with the most
well-known version of FGSM [11] on the baseline model
ClassifierCp. We used Cleverhans [65] to re-implement the
8Fig. 3: Success rates of TUP adversarial examples on X and
the disjoint validation set for targeted attacks of each target
class (from 0 to 9). Left column: Success rate of attacks
against the five networks on CIFAR-10; (a)–(e) correspond to
models ClassifierCp, ClassifierC0, ClassifierC1, ClassifierC2,
and ClassifierC3, respectively. Right column: Success rate
of attacks against the five networks on MNIST; (f)–(j) cor-
respond to models ClassifierMp, ClassifierM0, ClassifierM1,
ClassifierM2, and ClassifierM3, respectively.
Fig. 4: Perturbations computed by TUP method for CIFAR-
10. The ten classes shown are the target classes chosen for
the respective attack. The pixel values of the perturbations are
scaled for visibility. In order to show the semantic informa-
tion carried by the perturbation more clearly, two randomly
selected images from the training set are displayed for each
target class. Same-colored boxes on the perturbation images
and the sample images indicate the same semantic concept.
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Fig. 5: Effect of values of parameters k and η on attack success
rate.
“target class” variation [18] of FGSM, as the TUP method can
be used to launch a targeted attack. We generated 100 TUP
adversarial examples and 100 FGSM adversarial examples
for each source–target pair on CIFAR-10. In Fig. 6, the left
column represents the number of successful untargeted attacks
out of the 100 attacks for each source–target pair, and the
right column represents the number of targeted attacks. The
first row corresponds to the TUP attack, and the second row
to the FGSM attack. As shown by the heat maps, the TUP
method had high success rates in both targeted and untargeted
attacks, whereas FGSM only achieved a comparable success
rate in the untargeted attacks, performing poorly in the targeted
attacks. The number of successful TUP attacks was almost
9Fig. 6: Heat maps of the number of times an attack was
successful with the corresponding source–target class pair, for
both targeted and untargeted attacks by TUP and FGSM. (a)
TUP untargeted attacks, (b) TUP targeted attacks, (c) FGSM
untargeted attacks, and (d) FGSM targeted attacks.
evenly distributed across each source–target class pair, and
the heat maps for TUP are almost symmetric. This means that
for two classes A and B, perturbing images from A to B is
approximately as difficult as perturbing from B to A for a TUP
attack. For an FGSM attack, however, there exist some specific
source–target class pairs that are much more vulnerable than
others in both targeted and untargeted attacks. This indicates
that the TUP method has found a universal way to perturb the
inputs in a certain direction as specified by the target class,
whereas FGSM is inclined to perturb the original images in
the direction of some vulnerable target class shared by many
data points.
Cross-model transferability. Previous work demonstrated
the transferability property of adversarial examples, that is,
that adversarial examples crafted to mislead one model can
affect other models provided they are trained to perform the
same task, even if their architectures are different or their
training sets are disjoint [10], [66], [67]. To measure the
cross-model transferability of perturbations crafted by the TUP
method, i.e., the extent to which the perturbations computed
for a specific architecture are effective for another, we com-
puted perturbations for each architecture on both MNIST
and CIFAR-10 for each target class and fed the addition of
each universal perturbation to the other network. We report
the average attack success rate for the ten target classes
on all other architectures for the same dataset in Table II.
The perturbations had an average cross-model success rate
of greater than 63% on MNIST and 41% on CIFAR-10. In
the best cases, perturbations computed for the ClassifierM0
network had a success rate of 81.03% with ClassifierM3
(on MNIST), and perturbations computed for ClassifierCp
had a 62.97% success rate with ClassifierC0 (on CIFAR-10).
We observed that the perturbations computed for different
architectures had discrepant transfer capabilities across other
TABLE II: Cross-model success rates (%) on CIFAR-10 and
MNIST. Rows indicate the architecture for which the TUPs
were computed, and columns indicate the architecture for
which the success rate is reported. The maximum value in
each row is shown in bold font.
ClassifierCp ClassifierC0 ClassifierC1 ClassifierC2 ClassifierC3
ClassifierCp - 62.97 32.50 40.60 52.64
ClassifierC0 45.75 - 27.64 36.88 45.23
ClassifierC1 49.77 52.28 - 37.95 43.92
ClassifierC2 38.20 41.90 25.64 - 38.11
ClassifierC3 47.22 52.71 26.56 39.50 -
ClassifierMp ClassifierM0 ClassifierM1 ClassifierM2 ClassifierM3
ClassifierMp - 78.78 51.29 35.75 79.10
ClassifierM0 69.01 - 57.19 37.59 81.03
ClassifierM1 70.81 76.27 - 56.94 77.92
ClassifierM2 63.52 68.30 61.98 - 67.48
ClassifierM3 68.91 77.66 51.92 36.20 - %
TABLE III: Success rates (%) corresponding to different sizes
N for set X on MNIST and CIFAR-10.
Dataset N100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
MNIST 81.79 83.57 89.16 92.02 93.32 95.06 95.36 96.08 96.08
CIFAR-10 69.37 88.88 92.45 94.93 95.09 96.69 97.54 97.90 98.63
Datasets N1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000
MNIST 96.34 96.61 96.63 97.20 97.47 98.22 98.61 98.62 99.26
CIFAR-10 98.67 99.61 99.79 99.83 99.85 99.90 99.90 99.93 99.94
architectures. For example, the perturbations computed for
ClassifierM1 (all above 56%, and best case 77.92%) and
ClassifierCp (all above 40% except for ClassifierC1, and best
case 62.97%) generalized better than other architectures on
the same dataset. The bold numbers in Table II represent the
highest cross-model success rate of the TUPs calculated on
each model. These results show that the TUPs we created do
transfer to some extent across models, thereby demonstrating
that our TUP perturbations are not an artifact of a specific
network nor of a particular selection of training set but have
a degree of universality with respect to both data points and
architectures.
Size of set X . As described previously, each of the TUPs
above was computed for a set X , a random selection of
10, 000 examples from the training set (excluding images that
were originally classified as class t). Is such a large set X
necessary to achieve similar attack success rates? The answer
to this question may allow the TUP method to be made more
practical. Using a smaller set X does allow a more realistic
assumption regarding the attacker’s access to data; that is,
that the attacker has access to only a subset of the training
data rather than full access to any examples that were used in
training the target model. Meanwhile, using a smaller set X
makes the algorithm faster.
Table III shows the success rates on the validation sets
created with TUPs computed on variously sized subsets of the
training set. We repeated the experiment ten times for each set
X , each time randomly selecting the attack target t from the
ten classes of CIFAR-10 and MNIST; we report the average
results for the ten trials for each X . To eliminate the effect of
different projection steps and focus on the influence of the size
of set X , the projection operator was omitted here; although
this does cause the success rate to be higher than was shown
before (at the expense of the quality of perturbed images), it
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Fig. 7: Some TUP perturbations generated on sets X of differ-
ent sizes, using four randomly selected classes as examples.
Columns (a)–(e) correspond to N = 1000, 3000, 5000, 7000,
and 9000, respectively.
does not affect the trend of the change in success rate as the
size of X is varied.
We might expect that perturbations computed on higher
numbers of data samples to result in higher attack success
rates, and this holds true when set X contains fewer than 1000
samples. With a set X containing just 100 CIFAR-10 images,
the attack was successful for 69.37% of the images on the
validation set, and when perturbations were computed on 100
MNIST images, the attack succeeded in more than 80% of
cases. When set X was expanded to contain 1000 samples, the
perturbation computed on X fooled 98.67% of the validation
images on CIFAR-10 and 96.34% on MNIST; the success rates
did not change much after that. This surprising result suggests
that the proposed method is able to extract a large amount of
useful information from a very small dataset.
To illustrate this observation, we display the perturbations
of four randomly selected target classes on CIFAR-10 corre-
sponding to different sizes of set X in Fig. 7. As the images
show, explicit and rich semantic information was captured by
perturbations computed on a very small X; the perturbations
differed only slightly when computed on X sets of different
sizes. This hints that the structure of the dataset is quite
meaningful in the construction of TUPs, whereas the quantity
of data has no sizable effect.
C. Effect of region adversarial training on adversarial robust-
ness
We now examine the effect of region adversarial training
with perturbed examples on the baseline models ClassifierCp
and ClassifierMp. We used the TUP perturbations computed
for the networks ClassifierCp and ClassifierMp (described in
Section V-B and presented in Fig. 3) and performed region
adversarial training according to the method described in
Section IV-B. Specifically, we included the adversarial coun-
terparts of the original data during training through the simple
addition of a targeted TUP perturbation to all of the clean
examples classified as classes other than the target class t
by the attacked network. Then, we retrained the two baseline
models for 50 epochs. We report the classification accuracy for
the perturbed adversarial examples on the test set in Fig. 8.
We observe that although the accuracy was not as high as
that attained on the clean dataset, the use of region adver-
sarial training did greatly improve the classification accuracy
on adversarial examples compared with the accuracy before
retraining. As Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(c) show, the accuracy on
the perturbed test set rose to more than 72% for each class in
CIFAR-10; the previous accuracy was less than 31% for all
classes (average 10.34%, minimum 3.18%). For MNIST, the
accuracy increased to over 98% for each class, compared with
less than 14% (average 3.09%, minimum 0.07%) before.
Another exciting finding is that region adversarial training
using the TUPs not only strengthens the adversarial robustness
to TUP perturbations themselves but is also effective against
other adversarial attacks, such as the most well-known attack
method, FGSM [11]. We generated 1000 targeted FGSM
adversarial examples for each class in CIFAR-10 and MNIST
validation sets. The accuracies of these FGSM adversarial
examples before and after region adversarial training with
TUPs on the two models ClassifierCp and ClassifierMp are
reported in Fig. 8(b) and Fig. 8(d). The results show that the
networks trained using region adversarial training exhibited
greater robustness properties that were not limited to the
perturbations the models saw during retraining; their ability to
correctly classify the unseen FGSM patterns was also greatly
improved (by an average of 50.17% for CIFAR-10 and 91.52%
for MNIST). Note that in all of experiments reported in
this paper, better results were obtained on MNIST than on
CIFAR-10. One key reason is that the models we trained in
this study perform better on the clean MNIST dataset than
on the clean CIFAR-10 (as explained in Section V-A); thus,
we could say that the model ClassifierMp is more powerful
than ClassifierCp when they are performing their respective
tasks. On the other hand, the MNIST dataset contains only
black and white images, which have a pure background. In
addition, in order to provide heuristic comparisons, we were
more conservative in the parameter selections for CIFAR-10.
One question that remains is the following: Given that a
TUP attack on a very small set can be quite powerful (as we
have demonstrated), can region adversarial training with such
attacks still improve robustness further? To investigate this
issue, we measured the accuracies on the test set of CIFAR-
10 against TUP and FGSM attacks after region adversarial
training with TUPs computed on X sets of different sizes
for ClassifierCp; these are reported in Fig. 9. For comparison,
the results after adversarial training [11] with FGSM are also
shown in Fig. 9. The original accuracies (before retraining) are
shown in Table IV. Note that only the number of images (from
the training set) needed to generate adversarial examples for
adversarial training has been changed; the final accuracy was
calculated on the test set. As FGSM computes perturbations
on a single image at a time, whereas TUP computes an image-
agnostic perturbation and then simply adds the perturbation to
the clean input, the accuracies for FGSM shown in Table IV
do not change with N .
From the results shown, we find that region adversarial
11
Fig. 8: Comparison of accuracy before and after region adversarial training based on TUP against TUP and FGSM attacks.
TABLE IV: Accuracy(%) on test set against TUP and FGSM adversarial examples corresponding to different sizes of set X
for the ten target classes.
N
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
TUP FGSM TUP FGSM TUP FGSM TUP FGSM TUP FGSM TUP FGSM TUP FGSM TUP FGSM TUP FGSM TUP FGSM
1000 24.43 17.20 24.39 20.00 27.49 15.74 27.67 14.16 15.21 12.69 20.69 17.50 15.62 14.78 24.96 12.03 26.27 16.86 18.53 18.33
2000 23.39 17.20 22.31 20.00 25.47 15.74 24.66 14.16 13.99 12.69 18.60 17.50 14.04 14.78 21.21 12.03 25.50 16.86 17.88 18.33
3000 23.13 17.20 22.18 20.00 23.19 15.74 23.73 14.16 10.26 12.69 17.68 17.50 10.81 14.78 11.46 12.03 22.47 16.86 15.09 18.33
4000 22.31 17.20 19.93 20.00 22.12 15.74 19.30 14.16 8.70 12.69 16.19 17.50 7.02 14.78 10.74 12.03 21.69 16.86 12.68 18.33
5000 22.18 17.20 19.64 20.00 22.18 15.74 16.11 14.16 7.23 12.69 15.74 17.50 6.70 14.78 9.61 12.03 20.49 16.86 12.01 18.33
6000 19.93 17.20 17.81 20.00 19.91 15.74 15.19 14.16 6.56 12.69 15.34 17.50 5.70 14.78 8.36 12.03 19.37 16.86 11.59 18.33
7000 19.64 17.20 16.98 20.00 15.56 15.74 14.57 14.16 6.36 12.69 14.57 17.50 4.94 14.78 8.22 12.03 18.90 16.86 8.96 18.33
8000 17.81 17.20 14.43 20.00 15.49 15.74 14.26 14.16 6.01 12.69 13.59 17.50 4.63 14.78 6.74 12.03 17.72 16.86 8.02 18.33
9000 16.98 17.20 14.13 20.00 13.94 15.74 12.87 14.16 5.92 12.69 13.13 17.50 4.16 14.78 6.53 12.03 16.34 16.86 6.98 18.33
Fig. 9: Accuracy against TUP and FGSM attacks on test set before and after region adversarial training based on TUP (red)
or classical adversarial training based on FGSM perturbations (blue).
training based on the TUP algorithm offers comparative advan-
tages in improving adversarial robustness through heuristics-
based techniques. Firstly, both region adversarial training
(RAT) based on TUP and adversarial training (AT) based on
FGSM improve the test accuracy of the adversarial patterns
they used during the retraining. In all cases of the ten target
classes, however, RAT improves the accuracy of TUPs more
than AT improves the accuracy of FGSM. Secondly, RAT
also improves the robustness of the network against FGSM;
in fact, there is not much of a gap between RAT and AT
in their improvement of FGSM accuracy. By contrast, AT
improves the accuracy of TUP much less than does RAT.
Thirdly, the accuracy–N curves for RAT are flatter than those
for AT on both TUP and FGSM; this indicates that only a
small number of samples are needed for the RAT method to
achieve good results in enhancing adversarial robustness. This
might be because of the difference in the principles of the
two methods, AT hoping that the network can extract omitted
information from a large number of adversarial examples
on its own during retraining, and RAT using the missing
semantic information near the classification boundary to guide
the network’s training.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, the method proposed in this paper improves
the adversarial robustness of deep neural networks by empha-
sizing to deep models the missed semantic information of the
region around the decision boundary. Our research builds on
recent research on the generation of image-agnostic universal
adversarial perturbations to fool deep neural networks, but it
does so with attention to two entirely different goals: to have
the perturbations extract the unlearned semantic information
of a specific region in the manifold represented by a network
and to use them to enhance the robustness of the network.
We have proposed an algorithm named TUP to extract this
information that the model has not yet learned but that is
essential for correctly classifying the adversarial examples.
The algorithm uses an iterative process on a subset of the
training set to obtain a universal property across inputs, as
many previous algorithms have done, but we interfered with
the iterative process to push it toward the region corresponding
to a specified target class. Furthermore, to enhance adversarial
robustness, we designed region adversarial training based on
the TUP perturbations. Experimental results on two datasets
and ten classifiers show that region adversarial training based
on the TUP algorithm not only improves robustness against
TUPs but also markedly improves robustness against FGSM
perturbations.
The TUP algorithm uses just a few training samples to
effectively extract the semantic information obscured by the
blind spots of the deep models, and at the same time it
provides a powerful adversarial attack method that exhibits
transferability across different architectures. The proposed
region adversarial training method based on the TUP algorithm
offers an efficient way to enhance the robustness of classifiers,
especially the robustness of the region corresponding to a
specific class, as the perturbation is universal for each class.
By simply calculating a TUP perturbation on a very small set
and then adding the perturbation to clean images, the method
obtains the adversarial examples required for region adversar-
ial training. The proposed approach provides new ideas for
enhancing the adversarial robustness of DNNs and can be
used as a fast and efficient tool, especially in scenarios where
the cost of being attacked in a certain region of the network
is much higher than in others. Investigation and theoretical
analysis of the geometric correlations between different parts
of the decision boundary are left for future work.
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